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INTRODUCTION
When Buckingham Palace announced in November 2010 the much
anticipated news that His Royal Highness Prince William Arthur Philip
Louis of Wales would finally marry his longtime girlfriend, Miss
Catherine Elizabeth Middleton (dubbed in the popular press, "Waity
Katie," for her patience), the English-speaking world rejoiced.' But
amidst the general media euphoria, at least one sour note was sounded.
* Prof. of Law and Co-Director of the Family Law Clinic, the Pennsylvania State
University Dickinson School of Law. This Article was made possible by a sabbatical granted by
the Pennsylvania State University, as well as appointments as a Visitor to the Faculty of Law of
Cambridge University and the School of Law of the University of Chester. The author wishes to
thank for their assistance with this project: Dr. Mary Welstead, Harvard Law School; Prof.
Roger Kay, Head of Law University of Chester; Dr. Jens Scherpe, Fellow of Gonville and Caius
College, University Lecturer in Law, University of Cambridge; and Ms. Jo Miles, Fellow,
Trinity College, University in Law, Cambridge. He also wishes to thank his able research
assistant, Ms. Ujala Aftab. All views expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1. See Royal Wedding: Profile of Kate Middleton, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 29, 2011),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/kate-middleton/8136685/Royal-wedding-profile-of-
Kate-Middleton.html.
447
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Bishop of Willesden, Peter Broadbent, wrote on his Facebook page,
"I give the marriage seven years." 2 He was, quite properly, quickly
admonished and silenced.
Sadly, it is hardly unthinkable that a British royal marriage might not
stay the course. One only has to recall the six wives of Henry VIII to
know that royal nuptials come with no guarantee.4 Indeed the Church of
England itself is the enduring legacy of Henry's marital
disenchantment.5 Nor is royal dissolution, in both senses of the term, a
relic of the past. The ineffably sad and very public unraveling of the
union of Prince Charles and Lady Diana serves as a modem reminder
that "'til death do us part" is never a certainty, even in royal circles.7 It
cannot be known whether Prince William's marriage to Kate will
survive like the marriage of his grandmother to Prince Philip or
disintegrate like that of his mother and father.9
The stakes of marital instability among the royals are, of course,
potentially enormous.10 Not only was the schism with the Catholic
Church brought about because of Henry's disappointment with
Katherine of Aragon's failure to produce a male heir,' but arguably the
course of World War II was altered by King Edward VIII's insistence
on renouncing the throne in order to marry the woman he loved, a
twice-divorced American commoner.12
If the scions of two wealthy American families were planning to
wed, it is quite reasonable to believe that one or both of them-or their
families-would insist upon an ante-nuptial (also known as pre-nuptial
or pre-marital) agreement, spelling out their financial arrangements in
the event of a divorce. Since the landmark decision of Posner v.
Posner,13 such "prenups" have become commonplace in the United
2. The World at a Glance...London: Bishop Predicts Royal Divorce, WEEK, Dec. 3,
2010, at 10.
3. See id.
4. See, e.g., ANTONIA FRASER, THE WIVES OF HENRY VIII, 1 (Vintage Books 1994)
(1992).
5. See ALEC RYRIE, THE AGE OF REFORMATION: THE TUDOR AND STEWART REALMS,
1485-1603 110 (Pearson Educ. Ltd. 2009).
6. See, e.g., MICHAEL LEVINE, THE PRINCESS & THE PACKAGE (Renaissance Books
1998).
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., ELIZABETH LONGFORD, ELIZABETH R.: A BIOGRAPHY 119 (Musson 1983).
Elizabeth and Philip married November 20, 1947. Id.
9. See Sarah Lyall, Charles and Diana Agree on Divorce Terms, N.Y. TIMES (July 13,
1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/13/world/charles-and-diana-agree-on-divorce-terms.
html.
10. See, e.g., id.
11. See RYRIE, supra note 5, at 112.
12. See PHILIP ZIEGLER, KING EDWARD VIII 270-345 (Alfred A. Knopf 1990).
13. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
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States among the middle-class and those contemplating a second
marriage where there are assets and children from a prior marriage.14 In
Posner, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the old paradigm that a
prenup in contemplation of divorce was void as against public policy.,5
In Posner, the Florida Court reasoned:
We have given careful consideration to the question of whether
the change in public policy towards divorce requires a change in
the rule respecting antenuptial agreements settling alimony and
property rights of the parties upon divorce and have concluded
that such agreements should no longer be held to be void ab initio
as "contrary to public policy." If such an agreement is valid when
tested by the stringent rules prescribed in Del Vecchio v. Del
Vecchio (citation omitted), for ante- and post-nuptial agreements
settling the property rights of the spouses in the estate of the other
upon death, and if, in addition, it is made to appear that the
divorce was prosecuted in good faith, on proper grounds, so that,
under the rules applicable to postnuptial alimony and property
settlement agreements referred to above, it could not be said to
facilitate or promote the procurement of a divorce, then it should
be held valid as to conditions existing at the time the agreement
was made.'6
Although the 1970 Posner decision rather quickly led to recognition
throughout the United States of the benefits of allowing marrying
couples to set the financial terms (between themselves, but not vis-A-vis
children of the marriage) upon divorce,' 7 and although European
countries are generally in accord, England' 8 has been remarkably
resistant to recognizing and enforcing prenups.t9 With the much
anticipated decision of the UK Supreme Court in the Radmacher case,20
14. See ARLENE G. DUBIN, PRENUPS FOR LOVERS 8-9, 17 (Villard Books 2001).
15. Posner, 233 So. 2d at 385.
16. Id. (citing Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962). In Del Vecchio, the
Florida Supreme Court ruled that an ante-nuptial agreement in contemplation of a spouse's
death would be upheld if it was fair and reasonable, or a full and frank disclosure or general and
approximate knowledge of the other party's worth. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17,
20 (Fla. 1962).
17. See Andrew Blair-Stanek, Defaults and Choices in the Marriage Contract: How to
Increase Autonomy, Encourage Discussion, and Circumvent Constitutional Constraints, 24
ToURo L. REv. 31, 40-41 (2008).
18. All references to England are meant to include Wales, which follows English law on
prenuptial agreements. See, e.g., Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973, c. 18, § 23 (U.K.).
19. See, e.g., Cocksedge v. Cocksedge (1844) 60 Eng. Rep. 351-53, [244-45]; H v. W,
(1857) 3 K. & J. 382 [387] (U.K.).
20. Radmacher v. Granatino, [2010] UKSC 42, [2011] 1 A.C. 534 (appeal taken from
Eng.).
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England has arguably inched closer to adopting a contemporary law of
prenups by recognizing the right of adults to contract between
themselves.21 However, many questions remain unanswered.
This Article will provide an overview of American law of prenuptial
agreements, an analysis of the status of English law prior to the decision
in Radmacher, an analysis of Radmacher, a review of calls for reform
of the English law of prenups, and finally the author's suggestions as to
the minimum issues that England needs to address statutorily.
THE AMERICAN LAW OF PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
While the various American states generally recognize pre-nuptial
agreements as between future spouses, but not vis-a-vis minor children,
there is considerable disagreement concerning the rules for entering
such an agreement and for avoiding its terms. The variations among
the states are more than procedural niceties; they can lead to completely
inconsistent results, with one state upholding a prenup that another state
would vitiate.23
Among the matters in dispute is the critical timeframe(s) to be
examined. Should the court inquire into the circumstances of the parties
at the time the agreement was entered into or at the time of the divorce
litigation, or both? If fairness is to be judged, when is the critical time?
If the financially weaker party to the marriage is now encumbered with
the care of young children or has a disabling medical condition, does
such a circumstance render a previously valid agreement invalid, or
should adults be held to anticipate that there could be dramatic changes
in their lives that could affect their ability to support themselves?
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) completed a Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA) in
24th1983. Today, almost three decades later, only 22 states plus the
District of Columbia have enacted some version of the UPAA. Under
21. See id. at 540.
22. See generally Amberlynn Curry, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and Its
Variations Throughout the States, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 355 (2010) (analyzing how
states that have adopted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act have modified the original Act
to address their own needs).
23. See id.
24. Uniform Premarital Agreement Act of 1983, 9C U.L.A. 1, available at
http://www.law. upenn.edu/bill/archives/ulc/fnact99/1980s/upaa83.htm (drafted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and approved and recommended for all
states to enact).
25. Legislative Fact Sheet - Premarital Agreement Act, UNIF. LAW COMM'N,
http://www.nccusl.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Premarital%20Agreement%20Act (last
visited Sept. 2, 2011).
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the UPAA, a premarital agreement is enforceable unless the party
against whom enforcement is sought proves that:
1) that party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or
2) the agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and,
before execution of the agreement, that party:
i. was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the
property or financial obligations of the other party;
ii. did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any
right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations
of the other party beyond the disclosure provided; and
iii. did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an
adequate knowledge of the property or financial
obligations of the other party.26
The UPAA contains a few additional protections. "The right of a
child to support may not be adversely affected by a premarital
agreement." If an agreement modifies or eliminates spousal support
and the dependent spouse thereby becomes eligible for support under a
program of public assistance, the court may require the other spouse to
28
pay spousal support notwithstanding the agreement.
Otherwise, however, the UPAA takes a strongly pro-contract
position. There is no requirement that an agreement must be entered
into a minimum number of days before the marriage. 29 Even an
unconscionable agreement will be enforced as long as the party seeking
enforcement made a fair and reasonable disclosure of his or her property
and financial obligations.30 Where the other party would be eligible for
public assistance, the court will only award spousal support "to the
extent necessary to avoid that eligibility." 31 To put this in context, if the
other spouse would be eligible for Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
as an indigent disabled individual under Title XVI of the Social Security
Act, the enforcing spouse, no matter how wealthy, would at most be
ordered to pay $692 per month in spousal support in 2011, as that
amount would render the other spouse ineligible for federal SSI.32
26. Uniform Premarital Agreement Act § 6.
27. Id. § 3(b).
28. Id. § 6(b).
29. See id. § 1. The UPAA does not state a time frame so long as the agreement is made
"between prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage and to be effective upon
marriage." Id.
30. See id. § 6.
3 1. Id.
32. The 2011 SSI federal payment standard is $674 per month. See 2011 Social Security
Changes: Facts Sheet, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. (SSA), available at http://www.socialsecurity.
4512011]
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Moreover, the UPAA contains no requirement that the waiving spouse
receive independent legal advice or even have the opportunity to seek
legal advice.33 Finally, the burden of proof is placed on the party
seeking to escape enforcement. 34
One of the difficulties with the UPAA, as well as with other
"uniform" acts, is that it is not necessarily uniform from one adopting
state to another. A recent article entitled, The Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act and Its Variations throughout the States, takes twenty-
nine pages to detail the variations from one adopting state to the next.R
This point is well-illustrated by the 2008 decision of the Iowa
Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Shanks.36 As noted in Shanks, the
Iowa version of the UPAA diverges from NCCUSL's original version
by disaggregating unconscionability and lack of financial disclosure as
bases for voiding a prenup. 37 Furthermore, under the Iowa version of the
UPAA, unlike the original NCCUSL version, a premarital agreement
cannot adversely affect spousal support. 38
In Shanks, the wife sought to set aside the prenup on the grounds
that: 1) she had not entered into it voluntarily, but was, rather, under
duress or undue influence, 2) the agreement was unconscionable, and 3)
the husband had failed to make a full and fair disclosure of his property
and financial obligations.3 9 Under the Iowa UPAA, had she proven any
of these three grounds, the court would have invalidated the
agreement. 40 As it turned out, although she persuaded the trial court that
the agreement was entered into involuntarily, that conclusion was
reversed on appeal, and all of her challenges to the agreement ultimately
failed.4'
It is a fair generalization, however, that the American paradigm is a
gov/pressoffice/colafacts.htm. Under Social Security's rules, SSA disregards the first $20 per
month in unearned income. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1124(c)(12) (2011). Therefore, if a spouse or
ex-spouse received $694 per month in alimony, SSA would disregard the first $20 and the
remaining $674 would eliminate the federal benefit dollar for dollar. See id. In some states, such
as Pennsylvania, there are state supplementary benefits, which could potentially raise somewhat
the amount the supporting spouse would have to pay to eliminate all federal and state eligibility.
See Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in Pennsylvania, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. (Jan. 2011),
http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/I 11 50.pdf (last visited Jan. 2011).
33. See generally Uniform Premarital Agreement Act.
34. Id. § 6.
35. See Curry, supra note 21.
36. 758 N.W.2d 506 (Iowa 2008).
37. See id. at 511, 513 (citing IOWA CODE § 596.12 (1992)).
38. Id. at 513 (differentiating section 596.5(2) of the Iowa Code from the UPAA).
California's version of the UPAA likewise prohibits any waiver of spousal support. See In re
Marriage of Pendleton and Fireman, 5 P.3d 839 (2000).
39. Shanks, 758 N.W.2d at 512, 516.
40. See id. at 511.
41. Id. at 510-13, 519.
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contractual model, unlike the situation in England. Normally in the
United States, when such an agreement is challenged, the question turns
on its validity by considering whether the contract was entered into
voluntarily or was the result of fraud or duress.42 Nevertheless difficult
questions recur in applying these terms in the context of prenups,
especially when the prenup is presented or signed shortly before the
wedding, with no real opportunity for the other party to seek
independent legal counsel.43
Sometimes a prominent case addressing a prenup will prompt a state
legislature to amend its statute. For example, in In re Marriage of
Bonds, the California Supreme Court upheld, as voluntary, a prenuptial
agreement signed between baseball superstar, Barry Bonds, and his
wife, "Sun," whose first language was Swedish, the day before their
wedding.44 In apparently direct response, the California legislature
amended its version of the UPAA to provide that "it shall be deemed
that a premarital agreement was not executed voluntarily unless the
court finds in writing or on the record . . . [that] [t]he party against
whom enforcement is sought had not less than seven calendar days
between the time that party was first presented with the agreement and
advised to seek independent legal counsel and the time the agreement
was signed." 4 5
In a similar vein, but without specific statutory guidance, the North
Dakota Supreme Court recently vitiated a premarital agreement in large
part because it had been first presented to the husband the morning of
the wedding.46
The majority of states in the United States have not enacted any
version of the UPAA, and as it has been almost three decades since the
UPAA was proposed, it seems unlikely that the Act will be adopted in a
significant number of additional states.47 This leaves the states with
varying rules for addressing pre-marital agreements in light of the non-
UPAA states which may either have individual statutes addressing pre-
nups or look to their courts to adjudicate such agreements without
statutory guidance.48
Some states, such as Pennsylvania, which has no statute regarding
prenups, take a quite rigid, pro-contract position.49 In Simeone v.
42. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Baltins, 260 Cal. Rptr. 403, 413 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
43. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 817-19, (Cal. 2000).
44. See id. at 817-19, 838.
45. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615(c)(2) (West 2002).
46. Pember v. Shapiro, 794 N.W.2d 435, 439 (N.D. 2011).
47. See Legislative Fact Sheet - Premarital Agreement Act, supra note 14. Presently,
twenty-nine states have not enacted any version of the UPAA. See id
48. See, e.g., Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Injustice, 6 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 229, 236-37, 254-262 (Summer 1994).
49. See Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. 1990).
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Simeone, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court enunciated the rule that, as
long as there is a full and fair disclosure of assets, and basic contract
rules are not otherwise breached, the prenup is binding.5 0
In Simeone, the wife was a twenty-three year old unemployed nurse,
and the husband was a thirty-nine year old neurosurgeon making
$90,000 per year and with assets of $300,000.5' His attorney presented
the wife with the prenup on the eve of the wedding, and she signed it
without the benefit of counsel. The agreement limited the wife, in the
event of the divorce, to support payments of $200 per week, subject to a
total of $25,000.53 When the marriage fell apart nine years later, the
wife sought alimony pendente lite (APL), and the husband interposed
the agreement as a full defense.54 The wife attacked the prenup on the
grounds that she had no opportunity to consult with counsel and that the
agreement was inherently unreasonable.5 5 Upholding the agreement, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court utilized a strict contract analysis. 56
"Absent fraud, misrepresentation, or duress, spouses should be bound
by the terms of their agreements."57 The only requirement the court
imposed beyond normal contract law is that, "a full and fair disclosure
of the financial positions of the parties is required."5 8 As long as there is
such disclosure, in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation, or duress,
the agreement, as to the financial obligations of the spouses to each
other, is a binding contract. 59 The courts in Pennsylvania are not to
consider reasonableness of the contract either at the time it is entered or
at the time it is enforced. 60 "[T]he reasonableness of a prenuptial
bargain is not a proper subject for judicial review." 61 If the party against
whom the contract is to be enforced is now ill, taking care of young
children or a sick family member, or unemployed, that is not a valid
matter for a court to consider:
[E]veryone who enters a long-term agreement knows that
circumstances can change during its term, so that what initially
appeared desirable might prove to be an unfavorable bargain.
50. Id. at 166-67.
51. Id. at 163.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 164.
54. Id. at 163-64.
55. Id. at 166.
56. Id. at 166-67.
57. Id. at 165.
58. Id. at 167.
59. Id. at 165. Matters regarding children are generally outside the scope of an
enforceable contract. See In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 829-30, (Cal. 2000).
60. Simeone, 581 A.2d at 166.
61. Id.
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Such are the risks that contracting parties routinely assume.
Certainly, the possibilities of illness, birth of children, reliance
upon a spouse, career change, financial gain or loss, and
numerous other events that can occur in the course of a marriage
cannot be regarded as unforeseeable. If parties choose not to
address such matters in their prenuptial agreements, they must be
regarded as having contracted to bear the risk of events that alter
the value of their bargains.62
This very strict contract analysis has not met with universal approval
in the United States. In In re Marriage of Bonds, the California
Supreme Court opined:
Furthermore, marriage itself is a highly regulated institution of
undisputed social value, and there are many limitations on the
ability of persons to contract with respect to it, or to vary its
statutory terms, that have nothing to do with maximizing the
satisfaction of the parties or carrying out their intent. Such
limitations are inconsistent with the freedom-of-contract analysis
espoused, for example, by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 63
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Indiana has rejected the view that
courts should disregard the divorcing parties' current circumstances. 64
To the contrary, "a court may look to circumstances at the time of
dissolution to determine unconscionability of an ante-nuptial
agreement."65
Therefore, while it is clear that significant differences persist among
the states regarding the enforceability of premarital agreements, it is a
fair generalization that the states consider them to be contracts, albeit
special ones subject to special rules.66 The same cannot be said
regarding the law in England.
THE ENGLISH LAW OF PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
PRIOR TO RADMACHER
The English law of prenuptial agreements has remained remarkably
impervious to change over the past century and a half. In 1844, a Court
of Equity was confronted with an ante-nuptial agreement executed in
62. Id.
63. Bonds, 5 P.3d at 829.
64. Rider v. Rider, 669 N.E.2d 160, 163 (Ind. 1996).
65. Id.
66. See Uniform Premarital Agreement Act of 1983 § 2 cmt.
2011]1 455
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1837 between Thomas Cocksedge, Ann Whale, and William Whale,
Ann's father.6 7 The agreement set forth, inter alia, that Thomas would
provide Ann an annual sum of f400 for her maintenance "in the event
of any separation taking place between them." 68 The parties married
shortly after the agreement was signed, and they cohabited until August
1843, when Thomas left, allegedly because of Ann's (unproven)
adultery.69 Ann and her father filed a bill to compel specific
performance. 70 The Court of Equity denied relief based on the
agreement. 7 The Vice-Chancellor reasoned:
[W]here the contract is that, in the event of any separation taking
place between the husband and the wife, the husband shall make
a certain provision for his wife, the Court sees that it is an
inducement to the wife to be guilty of the worst conduct. There
may be innocent as well as guilty causes of separation between
husband and wife; but where the covenant by which the provision
is secured to the wife is expressed in general terms as it is in the
present case, the Court cannot sever it, and say that it shall be
good in one case and bad in another. If the bad conduct of the
wife may be the contingency on which the husband will be bound
to make the provision, the contract must fail altogether ... 72
In 1857, in H v. W, Vice-Chancellor Wood ruled in even more
general terms:
[I]t seems to me to be decided that, by policy of our law, no state
of future separation can ever be contemplated (during the
existence of coverture) by agreement made either before or after
marriage. It is forbidden to provide for the possible dissolution of
the marriage contract, which the policy of the law is to preserve
intact and inviolate. 73
To the extent that there is a "modem era" of English "nuptial law," it
dates to the 1929 decision of the House of Lords in Hyman v. Hyman, a
case involving not a prenuptial agreement but a postnuptial agreement. 74
The parties were married in September 1912 and had no children. 75 In
67. Cocksedge v. Cocksedge (1844) 60 Eng. Rep. 351-53, [244-45].
68. Id. at [244].
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at [246].
72. Id. at [246]-[47].
73. H v. W, (1857) 3 K. & J. 382 [387] (U.K.).
74. Hyman v. Hyman [1929] A.C. 601, 601 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
75. Id. at 605.
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September 1919, they executed a deed of voluntary separation.76 By that
time, the husband "was living in adultery with another woman, and he
continued to live in adultery after the date of the deed."7 7 The husband
agreed to pay his wife two sums, E200 and E2,000, plus a weekly sum
of E20 "free of income tax for her separate use and benefit and for her
maintenance during her life."7 8 In July 1923, the Matrimonial Causes
Act 1923 became law, "whereby for the first time a wife was given the
right to obtain a divorce solely on the ground of adultery by her
husband."79 In January 1926, the wife filed for divorce based on the
husband's adultery, and, in January 1927, a decree nisi was
pronounced.80 Shortly thereafter, the wife filed a petition for permanent
maintenance and the husband responded that she was bound by her
agreement.81 Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal ruled that the
wife was not precluded from prosecuting her claim for maintenance by
reason of the deed of separation. 82 On appeal, the House of Lords
affirmed.8 3 Lord Hailsham LC reasoned:
[T]he power of the Court to make provision for a wife on the
dissolution of her marriage is a necessary incident of the power to
decree such a dissolution, conferred not merely in the interests of
the wife, but of the public, and...the wife cannot by her own
covenant preclude herself from invoking the jurisdiction of the
Court or preclude the Court from the exercise of that
jurisdiction.84
Lord Atkin similarly opined:
[T]he statutory powers of the Court . .. were granted partly in the
public interest to provide a substitute for this husband's duty of
maintenance and to prevent the wife from being thrown upon the
public for support. If this be true, the powers of the Court in this
respect cannot be restricted by the private agreement of the
parties.85
Today, more than eight decades later, the Hyman rule applies not
76. Id
77. Id.
78. Id
79. Id
80. Id
81. See id at 606.
82. Id
83. Id.
84. Id at 614.
85. Id at 629.
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only to postnuptial (marital settlement) agreements, but also to
prenuptial agreements 86  based on the jurisdictional rationale:
recognizing the binding effect of a prenuptial agreement would derogate
from the courts' statutory jurisdiction to grant "ancillary relief' in a
divorce action.87
The current statutory framework for divorce in England and Wales,
the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973),88 as amended, provides
little clarity for the judiciary. On a literal reading, it is a masterpiece of
confusion and self-contradiction. Section 23 of the MCA 1973, gives a
court explicit jurisdiction to issue financial provision orders in
connection with divorce proceedings.8 9 The MCA 1973 also grants
courts authority to make "property adjustment orders," orders for the
sale of property, and pension sharing orders. 90
Section 25 of the MCA 1973 provides a list of factors which courts
must consider in exercising their powers of financial relief.9' The court
must "have regard to all the circumstances of the case, first
consideration being given to the welfare while a minor of any child of
the family who has not attained the age of eighteen." 92 As regards
financial orders affecting the parties to the marriage (but not in relation
to a child), Section 25 directs courts to consider:
(a) each party's income, earning capacity, and property,
(b) each party's financial needs, obligations and responsibilities,
(c) the standard of living previously enjoyed by the family,
(d) the age of each party and the duration of the marriage,
(e) either party's mental or physical disabilities,
(f) each party's past or foreseeable future contribution to the
welfare of the family,
(g) either party's conduct, if it would be inequitable to disregard
it,
(h) the value of any benefit that either party stands to lose as the
result of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage. 93
Noticeably absent from the section 25 factors is any explicit
reference to prenuptial agreements or consideration of foreign law.94
86. See Alexander Chandler, Pre-Nuptial Agreements After Crossley v. Crossley, FAM.
LAW WK. (2008), http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i= ed24924.
87. See Hyman, [1929] A.C. at 614.
88. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, c.18 § 23 (U.K.).
89. Id.
90. Id. § 24.
91. Id. § 25.
92. Id. § 25(1).
93. Id. § 25(2).
94. See id.
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Section 34 governs "maintenance agreements," but that term is given
a very broad definition.95 A "maintenance agreement" means any
agreement in writing made between the parties to a marriage
"containing financial arrangements," which, in turn, "means provisions
governing the rights and liabilities towards one another when living
separately of the parties to a marriage . . . in respect of the making or
securing of payments or the disposition or use of any property."96
Section 34(1)(a) provides that "[i]f a maintenance agreement
includes a provision purporting to restrict any right to apply to a court
for an order containing financial arrangements, then that provision shall
be void.97 Hence, a provision such as that upheld in Simeone, barring
the wife from seeking APL,98would presumably be void under the MCA
1973.99
However, subsection 1(b) appears to negate 1(a). It provides that,
"any other financial arrangements contained in the agreement shall not
thereby be rendered void or unenforceable and shall, unless they are
void or unenforceable for any other reason. . . be binding on the parties
to the agreement." 00 Thus, the provision in the agreement at issue in
Simeone for the wife to receive no APL10 would not, on its face, be
void under the MCA 1973.102
Moreover, section 35 gives the court explicit power to alter the terms
of the agreement during the lives of the parties if the court is satisfied
that:
[B]y reason of a change in the circumstances in the light of which
any financial arrangements contained in the agreement were
made or, as the case may be, financial arrangements were omitted
from it (including a change foreseen by the parties when making
the agreement), the agreement should be altered so as to make
different, or, as the case may be, so as to contain, financial
arrangements. 103
Hence, if a prenuptial agreement called for the wife to receive no
APL, barring her from seeking such relief in court, that provision might
be found by an English court to be void or binding or alterable by the
95. Id. § 34.
96. Id. § 34(2).
97. Id. § 34(1)(a).
98. Simeone, 581 A.2d at 168.
99. See Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 § 34(l)(a).
100. See id. § 34(1)(b).
101. Simeone, 581 A.2d at 164.
102. See Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 § 34(1)(b).
103. Id. § 35(1)-(2).
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court.104 And, the court may alter such a provision for reasons including
a change of circumstances explicitly foreseen by the parties! 0 5 As such,
it is hardly surprising that English courts have continued to struggle
with the law of prenuptial agreements, given the apparent contradictions
in the MCA 1973.106
Nor is it surprising that English courts appear to have a rather
cavalier attitude toward prenups made in another jurisdiction which
recite that they are to be construed under the law of that jurisdiction. In
1995, over a century and a half after the Cocksedge decision, Lord
Justice Thorpe was confronted with F v. F, a case involving not one, but
two prenups. 0 7 The bride-to-be was German, and the groom-to-be, who
was also of German origin, owned extravagant homes in multiple
jurisdictions.'08 The primary prenuptial agreement was in German and
purported to regulate the couples' affairs in accordance with German
and Swiss law. 9 The second prenup was in English and was intended
to be governed by American law.110 The agreements basically provided
that, in the event of divorce, the husband would provide the wife the
equivalent of the pension of a German judge (she having given up a
position in the German judicial civil service). "
The marriage broke down after the parties had had three children.112
The husband filed for divorce, based on the wife's alleged adultery, in
March 1993.113 The wife sought ancillary financial relief.14 Although
the husband sought to rely on their prenuptial agreement to contest the
court's jurisdiction and to restrict the wife's claim to the equivalent of
the pension of a Federal German judge, Lord Justice Thorpe summarily
dismissed the relevance of the prenuptial agreements and of German
law:
The other special condition which has to be considered in this
case, albeit briefly, is the existence of the antenuptial contracts. It
is not in dispute that contracts of this sort are commonplace in the
society from which the parties come. They are much emphasised
104. See id. §§ 34-35.
105. Id. § 35(1)-(2).
106. See generally Matrimonial Causes Act.
107. Stewart Leech, "With All My Worldly Goods I Thee Endow?" The Status of Pre-
Nuptial Agreements in England and Wales, 34 FAM. L.Q. 193 (2001-2002) (addressing F v. F
(Ancillary Relief: Substantial Assets) [1995] 2 FAM. L.R. 45 (Eng.)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
i11. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 194.
114. Id. at 193-94.
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by the husband in his affidavits, since if strictly applied they
would have the ridiculous result of confining the wife to the
pension of a German judge, whatever that may be. Equally, in the
affidavits the wife is urgent in protesting the circumstances in
which they came to be signed. I regard the protestations of both
in relation to these contracts as having an urgency that the
documents themselves do not demand. In this jurisdiction they
must be of very limited significance. The rights and
responsibilities of those whose financial affairs are regulated by
statute cannot be much influenced by contractual terms which
were devised for the control and limitation of standards that are
intended to be of universal application throughout our society. It
is said that these contracts would be strictly enforced against the
wife in Germany. I have declined to enlarge the arena to allow
evidence from German experts in that field. I cannot think that
even in Germany the wife would not have the right to deploy a
case either that there was some inequality of bargaining power,
alternatively undue influence, or that they are inconsistent with
social policy in Germany. For the purposes of my determination I
do not attach any significant weight to those contracts.1 15
Thus, according to Judge Thorpe, it was simply irrelevant whether
the (admittedly one-sided) agreements would have been binding under
German law, so irrelevant that he would not even entertain evidence on
the issue."1 6
Two years after F v. F, the Family Division was again confronted
with an extra-territorial prenuptial agreement . in a divorce case
involving an extremely wealthy couple.' In the 1997 case of S v. S, the
parties had executed a prenuR in New York, which purported to be
governed by New York law." The wife was a Swedish citizen, living
in England at the time of the divorce proceedings.119 The husband was
born in Austria, and was a citizen of Austria, Turkey, and Israel.120 At
the time of the divorce, he was a non-resident alien in the United
States. 121
The prenup was negotiated between May and November of 1986.122
It provided, inter alia, that in the event that either party had commenced
115. Id. at 194.
116. See id.
117. S v. S, [1997] 1 W.L.R. 1200, 1205 (Eng.).
118. Id. at 1202.
119. Id. at 1205.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 1206.
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an action in divorce prior to the husband's death, the wife would inherit
a percentage of his gross estate equal to one percent for each year of the
marriage, up to a ceiling of fifteen percent.1 Additionally, the husband
agreed to pay $250,000 into a trust for his wife's benefit, the trustee of
which was to be the Bank of New York, on the date of the marriage. 124
He would make additional quarterly paments of $12,500 until either
party commenced a divorce action. If a divorce action were
commenced, he would make a final payment of $100,000 into the trust,
whereupon the principal plus interest would be released to the wife.126
The parties were married in England in March 1987.127 Apparently
no children were born of the marriage. 128 The wife filed for divorce in
England on November 8, 1996, while the husband was out of the
country. 129 She spoke to him by telephone, not informing him of her
filing, and suggested that it might help to repair their difficulties if he
came to London to talk things over.130 When he arrived at their home in
Chelsea, he was served with the divorce petition.1 31 The husband
immediately returned to New York, where he filed for divorce on
November 21 and sought a declaration as to the validity of the
prenup.13 2 Each party applied for a stay of the other's divorce
proceeding. 3 3
At issue before the Family Division was whether to stay the wife's
divorce action in England, which would have the effect of subjecting
her to the New York courts and, presumably, the New York prenuptial
agreement.134 The English judge recognized that the wife would
probably be unable to set aside the New York prenup in a New York
court.13 Hence the decision on forum would, in turn, determine whether
the wife would have a reasonable likelihood of avoiding the prenup1 36
and attacking the husband's considerable wealth, which he admitted to
include $84,000,000 plus valuable real properties and chattel. 37
Judge Wilson acknowledged Judge Thorpe's statement in F v. F
123. Id. at 1206-07.
124. Id. at 1207.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 1208.
128. Id. at 1202.
129. Id. at 1209.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1209-10.
133. Id. at 1210.
134. Id. at 1201-02.
135. Id. at 1202-03.
136. See id at 1204.
137. Id. at 1205.
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that:
In this jurisdiction [prenuptial agreements] must be of very
limited significance. The rights and responsibilities of those
whose financial affairs are regulated by statute cannot be much
influenced by contractual terms which were devised for the
control and limitation of standards that are intended to be of
universal application throughout our society.' 3 8
But Judge Wilson warned that, "[t]here is a danger that these wide
words might be taken out of context." 39 Here, unlike in F v. F where
enforcement of the prenup would have led to a "ridiculous" result,4140 the
prenup was fairly negotiated on behalf of "worldly people"' 4 ' and
would leave the wife with assets of somewhat more than f 1,000,000. 142
The judge recognized that if he did not grant the husband's
application for a stay and the English court were to determine the wife's
application for ancillary relief, the MCA 1973 would preclude "any
choice of foreign law, however vividly the circumstances of the case
might protest its relevance." 4 3
Under the circumstances, the court was persuaded that New York
was "clearly more appropriate than England as a forum for the
proceedings for divorce and for the determination of financial issues
between the parties," notwithstanding the wife's primary residence in
England. 144 Thus, while an English court did not itself enforce a
prenuptial agreement, by declining to exercise jurisdiction where it
could have done so, it almost certainly bound the wife to her prenup.145
In 2007, twelve years after his decision in F v. F, Judge Thorpe (by
then Lord Justice Thorpe) back-tracked from his position that prenups
"must be of very limited significance." 46 In CrOSSley V. CrOSSley,147 the
parties were both independently wealthy, and both had children from
prior marriages.14 8 They met in June 2005, became engaged in
September 2005, and signed a prenup in November 2005, which
essentially provided that, in the case of a divorce, "both of them should
138. Id. at 1203 (citing F v. F, [1995] 2 FAM. L.R. 45, 66 (Eng.)).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1213.
142. See id. at 1214.
143. Id. at 1203.
144. Id. at 1215.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1203 (citing F v. F, [1995] 2 FAM. L.R. 45, 66 (Eng.)).
147. [2008] 1 FAM. L.R. 1467. At the time of Crossley, Judge Thorpe was sitting on the
Court of Appeal, and thus deemed "Lord Justice Thorpe." See id.
148. See id. at [11-[2].
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walk away from the marriage with whatever they had brought into
it."1 49 In apparently direct contravention of Section 34(1)(a) of the MCA
1973,150 the prenup included a provision that "[n]either party shall apply
to any court in any jurisdiction for any order for financial provision of
any kind based on the marriage of Stuart and Susan. . . .,,1
The parties were married in January 2006 and separated in March
2007.152 No children were born of the marriage. 153 The wife petitioned
for divorce in August 2007, and in September 2007, she began
proceedings for financial relief.154 She hoped to demonstrate that the
husband had undisclosed assets in Andorra and Monaco.' 5 5 The
husband sought an order directing the wife to show cause why her
claims should not be barred by the terms of the prenuptial agreement,
and the trial judge issued that order. 156
The Court of Appeal affirmed this disposition, given that "this was a
childless marriage of very short duration, for a substantial portion of
which the parties were living apart." 57 Significantly, both parties were
mature, previously married, and independently wealthy. 5 8 Rather than
viewing the prenup as being of "very limited significance," 59 Lord
Justice Thorpe reasoned:
All these cases are fact dependent and this is a quite exceptional
case on its facts, but if ever there is to be a paradigm case in
which the court will look to the prenuptial agreement as not
simply one of the peripheral factors in the case but as a factor of
magnetic importance, it seems to me that this is just such a
case.'60
Lord Justice Thorpe likened the prenup in this case to "a marital
property regime into which parties enter in civil law jurisdictions in
order to rovide for the property consequences of a possible future
divorce." 1 He added, "[i]t does seem to me that the role of contractual
149. Id. at [2]-[3].
150. Matrimonial Causes Act § 34(1)(a).
151. Crossley, 1 FAM. L.R. 1467 at [3].
152. Id.
153. See id. at [2].
154. Id. at [3]-[4].
155. See id. at [7].
156. Id. at [4], [19].
157. Id. at [14], [19].
158. Id. at [14].
159. See S v. S, [1997] 1 W.L.R. 1200, 1203 (Eng.) (quoting Lord Justice Thorpe in F v.
F, [1995] 2 F.L.R. 45, 66 (Eng.)).
160. Crossley, i FAM. L.R. 1467 at [15].
161. Id.at[17].
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dealing, the opportunity for the autonomy of the parties, is becoming
increasingly important."1 62 He cited calls in England for legislative
reforms addressing prenuptial agreements, and noted the chasm between
the law in England and the civil law countries of the European Union.' 6
He concluded, "[u]ndoubtedly there would be some narrowing between
this European divide if greater opportunity were given within our justice
system for parties to contract in advance of marriage, to make provision
for the possibility of dissolution."' 6
In 2008 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (known as the
"Board") considered the combined effects of a pre-nuptial and two
post-nuptial agreements in the case of MacLeod v. MacLeod.166 The
parties were both born and raised in the United States.167 When they
married on Valentine's Day 1994 in Florida, he was 49 and quite
wealthy, and she was 27 and a student.168 They entered into a pre-
nuptial agreement in Florida on their wedding day, which the court
recognized would be valid and generally binding under Florida law. 169
They moved to the Isle of Man in 1995 and made one post-nuptial
agreement in 1997 which, by its terms, lapsed in 19 9 8 .170 They made a
second post-nuptial agreement by deed in 2002, which became the focus
of their later litigation.1 7 1 The couple produced five sons before the
husband commenced divorce proceedings in September 2003.172 The
wife filed for ancillary relief, seeking financial provision in the amount
of thirty percent of the husband's wealth at marriage and fifty percent of
its increase in value during the marriage.173 She "asserted that the
agreements should be disregarded altogether." 74
As the case came to the Privy Council, the sole issue was whether
and how the 2002 post-nuptial agreement should affect an order for the
housing needs of the wife and children, and, more specifically, whether
the husband's payment should be made in a lump sum, as the wife
wished, or into a trust fund, as the husband wished and as provided for
162. Id.
163. See id.
I64. Id.
165. See, e.g., MacLeod v. MacLeod, [2008] UKPC 64, [2010] 1 A.C. 298.
166. Id. at [1], [5], [7]-[8]. The Privy Council had appellate jurisdiction because of the
parties' residence on the Isle of Man. See id. at [3].
167. Id. at [2].
168. Id.
169. See id. at [5], [7].
170. Id. at [3], [8].
171. Id. at [9].
172. Id. at [4], [13].
173. Id at [14].
174. Id.
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in the 2002 agreement.s75 Of relevance here, the Privy Council drew a
sharp distinction between the effect of a pre-nuptial agreement and that
of a post-nuptial agreement.' 76 It felt itself to be without authority "to
reverse the long standing rule that ante-nuptial agreements are contrary
to public policy and thus not valid or binding in the contractual
SCHC1n77sense." 
Declining to enter the thicket of reform, it stated, perhaps wisely,
that, "the difficult issue of the validity and effect of ante-nuptial
agreements is more appropriate to legislative rather than judicial
development."' 78 However, the Privy Council took an entirely different
view of post-nuptial agreements:
Post-nuptial agreements, however, are very different from pre-
nuptial agreements. The couple are now married. They have
undertaken towards one another the obligations and
responsibilities of the married state. A pre-nuptial agreement is
no longer the price which one party may extract for his or her
willingness to marry. There is nothing to stop a couple entering
into contractual financial arrangements governing their life
together, as this couple did as part of their 2002 agreement.179
Accordingly, the Privy Council concluded that the lower court had
erred in not finding the wife bound for herself by the 2002 agreement:
"However lacking in generosity the provision made for the wife, and of
course it was much less than she could have expected had there been no
agreement, there was no basis for interfering with it."' 80
RADMACHER: THE UK SUPREME COURT SPEAKS
Given the unsatisfactory state of English law on pre-nuptial
agreements, it is hardly surprising that English lawyers and legal
scholars eagerly awaited the decision of the relatively newly formed UK
Supreme Court in Radmacher v. Granatino.8 1 Radmacher involved
something of a role reversal.182 It was the wife who came from an
175. Id. at [18].
176. See id. at [36].
177. Id. at [311.
178. Id. at [35].
179. Id. at [36].
180. Id. at [45].
181. Radmacher, [2011] 1 A.C. 534 at [45]; see also Martin Loxley et al., Ancillary Relief
Update: Winter 2009, FAM. LAW 1079, 1082 (Nov. 2009).
182. See Radmacher, [20111 1 A.C. 534 at [13].
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extremely wealthy family. 8 3 She and her family wished to protect the
family's wealth, and she wanted the assurance that her future husband
"was marrying her for love and not for her money."' 84
The parties signed a prenuptial agreement in Germany in August
1998, she being German and he being French.185 "It contained a choice
of law clause that provided that the effects of their marriage, including
the laws of matrimonial property and succession, were to be subject to
the law of the Federal Republic of Germany." 86
The agreement was drawn up at the request of the wife's parents by
a German notary, who went over it with the wife and her future
husband.' It was written in German and was not translated.8  The
future husband declined the notary's suggestion that he postpone
signing it until he could take independent legal advice.' The future
husband, however, was neither naive nor unsophisticated at the time he
entered into the agreement.190 He was 27 years old and was a banker at
JP Morgan & Co., earning about £120,000 a year.19' The effect of the
prenup "was that neither party was to derive any interest in or benefit
from the property of the other during the marriage or on its
termination.
The parties were married in London in late November 1998, almost
three months after signing the agreement, and the marriage produced
two children. 193 The husband continued as a high earner in the banking
industry until sometime in 2002 when he "became disenchanted with
banking and embarked on research studies at Oxford with the object of
obtaining a D Phil' 94 [Ph.D.] in biotechnology."1 95 The parties separated
in October 2006, and the wife filed for divorce that same month.'16
The divorce itself was granted on the parties' cross-petitions in July
2007, but there was ongoing litigation over the custody and location of
the children and, of course, over the financial provisions of the
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at [9].
186. Id. at [12].
187. Id. at [87], [91].
188. See id. at [88].
189. Id. at [92].
190. See id. at [14].
191. Id. at [9], [14].
192. Id. at[12].
193. Id. at [9].
194. See D Phil Definition, MACMILLANDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.macmilan
dictionnary.com/dictionary/british/Dphil (last visited Sept. 19, 2011).
195. Radmacher, [2011]1 A.C. 534 at [14].
196. Id. at [9], [10].
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agreement.19 7 Despite the terms of the prenup, the husband sought an
order for both periodic payments and a lump sum.198
The trial court concluded that the circumstances of the drafting and
signing of the prenup were such that it should be accorded reduced
weight.199 The judge awarded the former husband a total of £5,560,000
plus E35,000 per year for each child (despite the fact that under the
custody order the children were to live primarily with their mother) and
E630,000 for housing in Germany. 200 The Court of Appeal reversed,
ruling that the agreement should have been given "decisive weight;"
and the husband appealed to the UK Supreme Court.20 1
The Supreme Court began its analysis by repeating the principle that
when a party to a marriage seeks ancillary relief, a court is not obliged
to give effect to either ante-nuptial or post-nuptial agreements.2 0 2
Specifically, the Court stated that "[t2 e parties cannot, by agreement,
oust the jurisdiction of the court.' 3 However, courts must give
"appropriate weight" to such an agreement.204
The Court then acknowledged that the refusal of English courts to
accord contractual status to such agreements puts English law at odds
with the law of Scotland, the rest of Europe, and most other
jurisdictions. 205 Further, the Court noted that there have been calls for
reform from both within and outside of the government, and that the
Law Commission was expected to issue a report on the subject in
2012012. Clearly, the Court felt itself constrained not to overstep its
authority in reforming the law.207
Nevertheless, the Court did make one important, and long overdue,
pronouncement. Agreeing in part with the Privy Council's approach in
MacLeod, the Court concluded that "the old rule that agreements
providing for future separation are contrary to public policy is obsolete
and should be swept away."208 Indeed the Court went beyond the
MacLeod position to apply this principle not just to post-nuptial
agreements, but to pre-nuptial agreements as well. 2  The Court rejected
as a general proposition the Privy Council's distinction between pre-
197. See id. at [10]-[11], 15.
198. Id. at [15].
199. Id.
200. Id. at [11], [15], [111].
201. Id. at [9], [16].
202. See id. at [2].
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at [3].
206. See id. at [4], [5], [6], [7].
207. See id at [7].
208. Id. at [52]; cf MacLeod, [2010] 1 A.C. 298 at [36].
209. Radmacher, [201111 A.C. 534 at [52].
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nuptial and post-nuptial agreements, while noting that individual cases
might be treated differently depending on the circumstances, such as the
presence of duress. 2 10
Accordingly, the Court directly held that, "[i]f parties who have
made such an agreement, whether ante-nuptial or post-nuptial, then
decide to live apart, we can see no reason why they should not be
entitled to enforce their agreement." 2 1 However, one ought not read too
much into this seemingly definitive pronouncement because the Court
immediately undercut it by adding that:
This right will, however, prove nugatory if one or other objects to
the terms of the agreement, for this is likely to result in the party
who objects initiating proceedings for divorce or judicial
separation and, arguing in ancillary relief proceedinAs that he or
she should not be held to the terms of the agreement.
The Court proceeded to review the decisions of the lower courts,
addressing the circumstances of the preparation and signing of the
agreement, as well as the principles of need, compensation, and
sharing.2 13 It cited the "unchallenged evidence" that: "(a) the agreement
was valid under Germany law; (b) the choice of German law was valid;
(c) there was no duty of disclosure under German law; (d) the
agreement would be recognised as valid under French conflict of law
rules." 214 Nevertheless, the Court reiterated that English courts will
normally apply English law in making an order for financial relief
"irrespective of the domicile of the parties, or any foreign
connection."2 15 Indeed, "the issues in this case are governed exclusively
by English law. The relevance of German law and the German choice of
law clause is that they clearly demonstrate the intention of the parties
that the ante-nuptial agreement should, if possible, be binding on
them." 216
Reviewing the making of the agreement, the Supreme Court
affirmed the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the trial judge had erred
in finding a lack of appropriate safeguards. 217 The trial judge had based
her conclusion on: the agreement being very one-sided, the husband
having received no legal advice, the agreement depriving the husband of
210. See id. at [52]-[61].
211. Id. at [52].
212. Id.
213. Id. at [118]-[23].
214. Id. at [101].
215. Id. at [103].
216. Id. at [108].
217. See id. at [114]-[17].
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all financial claims even in the event of want, the lack of financial
disclosure by the wife, the lack of negotiations, and the subsequent
births of the two children.218 It is noteworthy that Lord Justice Thorpe,
sitting on the Court of Appeal in Radmacher, had rejected all these
concerns, despite the fact that in the 1995 case of F v. F., he had
summarily dismissed as irrelevant a less one-sided German prenuptial
219
agreement where the wife was legally trained.
The Supreme Court concurred with the Court of Appeal's analysis
that the husband had understood the agreement and had had the
opportunity to take legal advice; that he knew that the wife had
substantial wealth and showed no interest in ascertaining more detailed
knowledge of it; that he would have signed the agreement even if he had
had more knowledge of her wealth; and that the lack of negotiations
was irrelevant and merely reflected the fact that such an agreement was
commonplace among people of their socio-economic status. 220 Further,
the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that it was unclear
whether the trial judge had really taken the agreement into account at all
in making financial provision for the husband.22'
Having concluded that the agreement had been fairly entered into,
222
the Supreme Court addressed the merits of the agreement. The Court
looked to the circumstances of the parties prevailing at the time of the
breakdown of the marriage. 223 The husband had not become
incapacitated during the marriage and was not in need.224 Under these
circumstances, the agreement was not "manifestly unfair."225 Nor would
the factor of compensation warrant vitiating the agreement. 226 The
husband had not abandoned his lucrative banking career for the "fields
of academia" because of family demands, but rather of his own
227accord. Finally, because he had clearly renounced any intention to
share in his wife's wealth, the factor of sharing was not of any
228significance. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that, in regard to
financial provision for the husband himself, he should be held to the
ante-nuptial agreement. 229
218. Id. at [110].
219. Id. at 112; cf Leech, supra note 55, at 194 (discussing F v. F, [1995] 2 F.L.R. 45
(Eng.)).
220. Id. [114]-[17].
221. Id. at [117].
222. Id. at [118]-[23].
223. Id. at [119].
224. Id.
225. Id. at [118]-[20].
226. Id. at [121].
227. Id.
228. See id. at [122].
229. Id. at [123].
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Thus, the bottom line in England remains that prenuptial agreements
may be binding agreements but, at the same time, they are not binding
"in a contractual sense." They can always be challenged in court.230 in
short, courts may find prenuptial agreements to be binding, but are
231
simply not required to do so under any circumstances.
CALLS FOR REFORM IN ENGLAND
As already mentioned, there have been numerous calls for reform of
the law of nuptial agreements in England. In Pounds v. Pounds in 1994,
a case involving a post-nuptial agreement, 2 32 Lord Justice Hoffman
opined:
The result . .. is that we have, as it seems to me, the worst of both
worlds. The agreement may be held to be binding, but whether it
will be can be determined only after litigation and may involve,
as in this case, examining the quality of the advice which was
given to the party who wishes to resile. It is then understandably
a matter for surprise and resentment on the part of the other party
that one should be able to repudiate an agreement on account of
the inadequacy of one's own legal advisers, over whom the other
party had no control and of whose advice he had no knowledge.
. . . In our attempt to achieve finely ground justice by attributing
weight but not too much weight to the agreement of the parties,
we have created uncertainty and, in this case and no doubt others,
added to the cost and pain of litigation. 233
In 1998, the Home Office published a "Green Paper"234 entitled
"Supporting Families" in which it announced that "[t]he Government is
considering whether there would be advantage in allowing couples,
either before or during their marriage, to make written agreements
dealing with their financial affairs which would be legally binding on
divorce."235
However, the actual proposal contained many caveats. Such an
230. See, e.g., id. at [52].
231. See id Baroness Hale dissented from much of the majority opinion in Radmacher.
See id. at [138]. However, she would still have given the agreement some weight. Id. at [184]-
[95].
232. Pounds v. Pounds, [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1535, 1537 (appeal taken from Eng.).
233. Id. at 1550-51 (Hoffman, L.J., concurring).
234. See, e.g., What is Green Paper?, GUARDIAN, http://www.guardian.co.uk/care
andsupportreform/what-green-paper (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
235. Home Office, Supporting Families, A Consultation Document, NAT'L ARCHIVES
4.21(1998), http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ERORecords/HO/421/2/acu/sfpages.pdf.
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agreement would not be legally binding:
[W]here there is a child of the family, whether or not that child
was alive or a child of the family at the time the agreement was
made; where under the general law of contract the agreement is
unenforceable, including if the contract attempted to lay an
obligation on a third party who had not agreed in advance; where
one or both of the couple did not receive independent legal
advice before entering into the agreement; where the court
considers that the enforcement of the agreement would cause
significant injustice (to one or both of the couple or a child of the
marriage); where one or both of the couple have failed to give
full disclosure of assets and property before the agreement was
made; [or] where the agreement is made fewer than 21 days prior
to the marriage (this would prevent a nuptial agreement being
forced on people shortly before their wedding day, when they
may not feel able to resist).236
Had this reform been implemented, it might have changed the result
in Radmacher, since there were two children born of the marriage, the
husband did not receive legal advice, and the wife did not make full
disclosure of her assets and property.2
But even this extremely modest proposal met with disapproval from
the family law bench.238 All the judges of the Family Division published
a response which was far from supportive:
We have reservations about whether the law should strive to
encourage pre-nuptial agreements. We all still believe strongly in
the institution of marriage as a source of personal and social
stability and wonder whether the pre-nuptial agreement
conditions the couple to the failure of their marriage and so helps
to precipitate it.239
The family judges noted their "unanimous lack of enthusiasm for the
pre-nuptial agreement." 240
When Crossley was decided in 2007, there was hope that it would
provide an impetus to Parliament to address prenuptial agreements
236. Id.14.23.
237. Radmacher, [2011] 1 A.C. 534 at [9], [92], [110].
238. See Nicholas Wilson, Ancillary Relief Reform, Response of the Judges of the Family
Division to Government Proposals (made by way of submission to the Lord Chancellor's
Ancillary Relief Advisory Group), FAM. LAW 159-63 (Mar. 1999).
239. Id. at 162.
240. See id.
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legislatively. 24 1 In Pre-nuptial Agreements: A Rethink Required,242
Christopher Sharp QC argued strenuously that Section 34 of the MCA
197324 "now rests on principles not wholly in keeping with twenty-first
century values." 244 He expressed the hope that the Law Commission
would be able to draw up a draft Parliamentary Bill by 2012,245 directly
addressing prenups, including provisions to ensure fairness, such as full
disclosure of assets, independent competent legal counsel on both sides,
and "a sensible gap between the agreement and the wedding (at least 21
days)."246
Even in the absence of legislative relief, other commentary viewed
Lord Justice Thorpe's opinion in Crossley as generally elevating the
status of prenups in English law. In Crossley v. Crossley: Are Pre-
nuptial Agreements Now Binding in England?,24 7 Mark Harper and
Lucie Alhadeff argued that, while Crossley did not make prenups
binding, it did make them "one of the factors to be taken into account in
carrying out the s 25 exercise."248
In 2005, the organization Resolution (formerly the Solicitors Family
Law Association) published a proposal of its Law Reform Committee
entitled, "A More Certain Future-Recognition of Pre-marital
Agreements in England and Wales." 249 The Committee proposed that
"pre-marital agreements become legally binding subject to an
overriding safeguard of significant injustice" to either party or a minor
child of the family. 250
The Law Commission for England and Wales announced in May
2008 its project to review the law of marital property agreements:
This project will examine the status and enforceability of
agreements made between spouses or civil partners (or those
241. Crossley, 1 FAM.L.R. 1467 at [17].
242. Christopher Sharp, Pre-nuptial Agreements: A Rethink Required, FAM. LAW 741
(Aug. 2008).
243. Matrimonial Causes Act § 34(1)(a). Section 34 of the MCA 1973 makes void
agreements not to seek financial orders from the court. Id.
244. Sharp, supra note 146(b), at 741.
245. Id. at 750.
246. Id. at 748.
247. Mark Harper & Lucie Alhadeff, Crossley v. Crossley: Are Pre-nuptial Agreements
Now Binding in England?, FAM. LAW 334 (April 2008).
248. Id. at 337.
249. A More Certain Future - Recognition of Pre-Marital Agreements in England and
Wales, RESOLUTION, http://www.resolution.org.uk/sitecontent-files/files/amore-certain
futureresolution.pdf [hereinafter A More Certain Future] (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
Resolution, formerly the Solicitors Family Law Association, is an organization of lawyers that
believes in a "non-confrontational approach to family law matters." About Us, RESOLUTION,
http://www.resolution.org.uk/about-us/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
250. A More Certain Future, supra note 249, IN 7.7, 7.8.
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contemplating marriage or civil partnership) concerning their
property and finances. Such agreements are not currently
enforceable in the event of the spouses' divorce or the dissolution
of the civil partnership. The court may, however, have regard to
251
them in determining what ancillary relief is appropriate.
The Law Commission's provisional proposals and consultation
questions were released in January 2011. The Law Commission's
most basic and profound provisional proposal would change the
fundamental law on nuptial agreements in England:
Contractual Validity and Public Policy
We provisionally propose that for the future an agreement made
between spouses, before or after marriage or civil partnership,
shall not be regarded as void, or contrary to public policy, by
virtue of the fact that it provides for the financial consequences of
253
a future separation, divorce or dissolution.
Contractual Validity
We provisionally propose that, in the event that qualifying nuptial
agreements are introduced, a marital property agreement should
not be treated as a qualifying nuptial agreement unless it was a
valid contract.254
Moreover, the party against whom the agreement is sought to be
enforced would have to have received "material full and frank
disclosure of the other party's financial situation" 255 and have received
"legal advice at the time when it was formed." 25 6 However, the Law
Commission did not provisionally propose a timing requirement for
prenuptial agreements.257 The Law Commission's finalprenptia ageemets.258
recommendations are expected in 2012.
251. THE LAW COMM'N, LC31 1, TENTH PROGRAMME OF LAW REFORM, 1.17 (June 10,
2008), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/docs/1c311_10thProgramme.
pdf.
252. THE LAW COMM'N, CP198, MARITAL PROPERTY AGREEMENTS, A CONSULTATION
PAPER, available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/docs/cpl98_Marital Property
Agreements Consultation.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2011). See also Newsline, Pre-nuptial
Agreements in England and Wales, INT'L FAM. LAW, 4, 5 (Mar. 2011).
253. MARITAL PROPERTY AGREEMENTS, A CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 153, 1 8.3.
254. Id. 8.7.
255. Id. 8.10.
256. Id. 8.12.
257. Id. 8.15.
258. See, e.g., Radmacher, [2011]1 A.C. 534 at [6].
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In 2010, Resolution again called for reform in the law 2 59 by noting
that "English domestic law is out of line with most other jurisdictions of
the world, in particular with those of Europe, in not recognising
agreements. This can lead to 'forum shopping' where the spouse
seekin 6 a divorce will try to secure the jurisdiction most favorable to
them. o
This time, Resolution made a more detailed proposal than it had in
2005, suggesting that the following be added to the Matrimonial Causes
Act 1973:
s. 25(2A) The court shall regard any agreement in writing entered
into between the parties to the marriage in contemplation of or
after the marriage for the purpose of regulating their affairs on
the breakdown of their marriage as binding upon the parties and
shall make an order in the terms of the agreement unless:
(a) the agreement was entered into as a result of unfair pressure or
unfair influence;
(b) one or both parties did not have a reasonable opportunity to
receive independent legal advice about the terms and effect of
the agreement;
(c) one or both parties failed to provide substantially full and
frank financial disclosure before the agreement was made;
(d) the agreement was made fewer than 42 days before the
marriage;
(e) enforcing the agreement would cause substantial hardship to
either party or to any minor child of the family.
s. 25(2B) If one or more of the factors in paragraphs (a) to (e) of
subsection 25(2A) applies, the Court shall give the agreement
such weight as it thinks fit taking into account:
(a) all the facts surrounding the agreement;
(b) the matters in section 25(1) and (2).261
Thus, under this proposal, the Radmachers' agreement would not
have been binding since Ms. Radmacher did not provide full and frank
259. Family Agreements: Seeking Certainty to Reduce Disputes, The Recognition and
Enforcement for Pre-nuptial and Post-nuptial Agreements in England and Wales, RESOLUTION
1, http://www.resolution.org.uk/site-content-files/files/familyagreements.pdf [hereinafter
Family Agreements] (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
260. Id. at 2.
261. Id at 3-4.
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financial disclosure before the agreement was made.262 However, as
actually happened in the case at the appellate levels, the courts would
give the agreement appropriate weight based on all the facts.263
Not all observers agree that there is a need to reform the English law
of prenups.264 For example, Professors Nigel Lowe and Roger Kay
delivered a paper to the 13th World Congress of the International
Society of Family Law, which concluded:
Although this position on prenuptial agreements is out of line
internationally, given that it is now well established that the
existence of such agreements is a circumstance that must be taken
into account even to the extent that it can be decisive, it is
suggested that far from being a case of English eccentricity the
current position provides a pragmatic solution that enables justice
properly to be done... . The most we would concede is that there
may be an advantage from the point of view of certainty in
amending s 25 of the MCA 1973 to make it clear that the making
of a prenuptial agreement is a factor that should be taken into
account when determining the appropriate ancillary relief.265
Nevertheless, it is likely that calls to end, or at least temper, this
"English eccentricity" are bound to increase. As noted by Resolution,
the refusal of English law to give binding effect to prenups has
266extraterritorial consequences. Thus, unhappily married spouses
desiring to escape both their marriages and their pre-nups may seek
legal refuge in England.267 England's combination of not giving binding
contractual status to pre-nupS 68 and not applying foreign law to the
dissolution of marriages, even when those marriages were entered into
elsewhere and the couple signed a foreign prenup containing a provision
that it is to be interpreted under the law of that jurisdiction, 9 makes
England a highly desirable jurisdiction for forum shopping.270 It is
hardly surprising that Lord Justice Thorpe has proclaimed, "London-
262. See Radmacher, [2011)1 A.C. 534 at [110].
263. Id. at [2].
264. See Nigel Lowe & Roger Kay, The Status of Prenuptial Agreements in English Law
- Eccentricity or Sensible Pragmatism?, in FAMILY FINANCES 395-413 (Bea Verschraegen ed.,
Holzhausen Druck & Medien Ges.m.b.H, 2009).
265. Id. at 413.
266. See Family Agreements, supra note 259, at 2 (noting that the failure of English
domestic law to recognize pre-nuptial and post-nuptial leads to forum shopping).
267. See id.
268. See e.g., MacLeod, [2010] 1 A.C. 298, [31].
269. See Matrimonial Causes Act § 25(2) (precluding the court from considering foreign
law as a factors to consider in determining financial orders affecting parties to the marriage).
270. See Family Agreements, supra note 259, at 2.
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the Divorce Capital of the World." 2 71
For persons with significant assets, who want to preserve and protect
those assets for themselves or their existing children, who are
contemplating marriage or remarriage, this is indeed the "worst of both
worlds." 272 They cannot afford not to negotiate a pre-nuptial agreement
because there remains the possibility that it will be enforced by an
English court or at least taken into account in setting the amount of
financial relief.273  However, they must also be aware that
notwithstanding any terms to the contrary in the agreement, it may be
challenged in an English court, and the court will not feel constrained to
enforce it. 274 And, obviously, the more money is at stake, the more
likely it is that litigation will ensue. Can Prince William, heir once-
removed to the British throne, afford not to have a pre-nuptial
agreement with Kate, and what might such an agreement provide?
A RECENT ROYAL PRECEDENT
The 1990s saw the very public, and often sordid, unraveling of the
"fairytale" marriage of William's parents, Charles, Prince of Wales, and
Princess Diana, nde Spencer.275 There is no indication in the all-too-
public record of any prenuptial agreement between the two, prior to
their marriage on July 29, 1981. 27 Their marriage, of course, produced
two sons, William, who was born in June of 1982, and Harry, who was
277born in September of 1984, as well as much fodder for British and
American tabloids.278 Finally, on December 9, 1992, Prime Minister
John Major formally announced their separation in the House of
Commons.279
It was not, however, until July 1996, that the star-crossed couple
were able to reach a divorce settlement. 280 The actual terms of that
settlement have not been made public, but reportedly Diana received a
271. Lord Justice Thorpe, London - The Divorce Capital of the World, FAM. LAW 21
(Jan. 2009).
272. Pounds v. Pounds, [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1535, 1550 (appeal taken from Eng.).
273. See Family Agreements, supra note 259, at 3-4.
274. See id. (proposing that an agreement may not necessarily be binding based upon the
of circumstances surrounding the agreement and giving the court discretion on how much
weight to afford the agreement).
275. See Lyall, supra note 9.
276. See SALLY BEDELL SMITH, DIANA: THE LIFE OF A TROUBLED PRINCESS 100 (Aurum
Press Ltd. 2d ed. 1999).
277. Id. at 132.
278. See, e.g., Lyall, supra note 9.
279. Id. at 233, 245.
280. Id. at 304.
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lump sum of E15 million, more than E400,000 a year to underwrite her
office, and the "semi-royal" title of Diana, Princess of Wales. 28 1 She
would live in Kensington Palace, where her office would also be
located.282 She would have access to royal aircraft and the state
apartments at St. James Palace for entertaining.283 She would have
possession of all her royal jewelry, which would eventually be passed
on to the future wives of her sons.
If, as predicted by the Bishop of Willesden, Kate and William's
marriage lasts but seven years and assuming that, by then, William has
become the Prince of Wales),28 can Kate be expected to be provided for
as generously as was Diana before her? Can William protect royal
assets, if not his own (if any)? Would there be any way for the two of
them to avoid the very public kind of bickering engaged in by Charles
and Diana?
One thing is clear: no royal prenup would carry an assurance of
being enforced without amendments to the MCA 1973. Nevertheless,
with due respect to Professors Lowe and Kay, as I hope this article has
demonstrated, it is past time to end this eccentricity of English law.2 87
Although the judges of the Family Division argued in 1999 that giving
weight to antenuptial agreements in contemplation of dissolution would
undermine the institution of marriage, 288 the failure to provide some
assurance that marrying parties can agree to financial arrangements
between themselves should their marriages fall apart can act as a strong
deterrent to marriage or remarriage, especially among the rich and
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 304-05; see also Lyall, supra note 7(a).
285. See The World at a Glance ...London: Bishop Predicts Royal Divorce, supra note 2.
One can only hope that William does not have to wait in line for the throne as long as his father,
Prince Charles, who set the record for being next in line, having waited 59 years, two months,
and 14 days, eclipsing the previous record of his great-great grandfather, King Edward VII.
David Batty, Prince Charles Becomes Britain's Longest-Serving Heir to Throne, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/2011/apr/20/prince-charles-longest-serving-heir-
throne/print. Edward VII acceded to the throne on the death of his mother, Queen Victoria. Id.
Charles is the presumptive heir to his mother, Elizabeth II, who turned 85-years-old on April 21,
2011. See id. Charles is now 62 years of age. Id. Elizabeth II's mother lived to be 101. Id. If
Elizabeth II also lives to be 101, Charles would be 78-years-old when he accedes to the throne.
See id.
286. See generally Matrimonial Causes Act. As such cases as that of Barry Bonds make
clear, even in a jurisdiction, such as California, that makes statutory provision for premarital
agreements, there is no guarantee that such an agreement will not be challenged, especially
where one of the parties is extremely wealthy. See supra text accompanying notes 44 & 63. See
also In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 817-19, 838 (Cal. 2000).
287. See Nigel Lowe & Roger Kay, supra note 264, at 395-413.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 238-40.
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famous.289 Without such assurance, what solicitor could possibly have
advised Sir Paul McCartney, for example, to marry again after the
debacle of his divorce litigation with Heather Mills-McCartney? 290 And,
as famously demonstrated in the McCartney divorce action, the lack of
a prenup may incline a divorcing spouse to make wildly extravagant
financial claims. 29 1
MODEST PROPOSALS
With the Radmacher decision recognizing at long last that
agreements providing for future separation are not against public policy,
English law has advanced, almost, to the point in 1970 that the Florida
Supreme Court revolutionized American law with the Posner
decision.292
Acknowledging that the hodge-podge of American law on prenuptial
agreements is hardly a model of consistency, and recognizing that an
American law professor may well be accused of hubris in doing so, I
suggest the following as minimal statutory reforms necessary to bring
the English law of prenups forward into the 21s' Century and provide
some modicum of certainty to propertied marrying persons (and their
counsel/solicitors).
At a minimum, the MCA 1973 needs to be amended to provide
explicitly for prenuptial agreements, to set forth conditions for their
validity and specify what are-and are not-proper subjects for
bargaining. The MCA 1973 also needs to delineate what pre-conditions
are waivable. Thus, if there must be, as I believe, full and frank
financial disclosure on both sides, the statute needs to specify whether a
party can waive such disclosure, as in Radmacher.293 If there must be,
as I believe, some minimum time period between the presentation of the
written agreement and the date of the wedding, the statute must specify
289. See, e.g., McCartney v. Mills McCartney, [2008] EWHC 401, [2008] 1 FAM. L.R.
1508.
290. See id While this article was undergoing the editing process, Sir Paul did take the
plunge for a third time, marrying heiress Nancy Shevell in London on October 9, 2011. See
Paul McCartney's Wedding, PHILLY.COM (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.philly.com/
philly/entertainment/homepage/PaulMcCartneyWedding.html.
291. See id. at [3]. Heather Mills-McCartney believed she should be entitled to
£125,000,000 of Sir Paul's assets after less than four years of married life. Id. Infuriated at
receiving a mere E24,300,000 award, she dumped water on Sir Paul's lawyer's head at the end
of the court proceeding. Id; see also Frances Gibb, Heather Mills Throws Water over Paul
McCartney Lawyer Over £24.3m Divorce, THE TIMES (Mar. 18, 2008), http://business/times
online.co.uk/tol/business/law/article3572346.ece.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 13-17.
293. SeeRadmacher, [2011] 1 A.C. 534 at [115], [117].
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whether that is waivable. If there must be, as I believe, the realistic
opportunity for the party who did not draft the agreement to take
independent legal advice, the statute likewise must address waivability
of that right.
Section 25 of the MCA 1973 needs to be amended to explicitly
include as matters for consideration in fashioning financial relief both:
a) valid written agreements between the parties on subjects appropriate
for such agreements and b) foreign law, where applicable.
Section 34(1)(a) needs to be amended to provide that an agreement
to oust the jurisdiction of the court shall only be invalid to the extent
that it violates rules of contract law generally or the new rules on nuptial
agreements, and only insofar as it violates such rules.
Section 35 needs to be amended to limit the authority of a court to
alter the terms of an agreement to those situations where the agreement
is inconsistent with general contract law or nuptial contract law or has
become unconscionable and only to the extent of such inconsistency or
unconscionability. The current language that an agreement may be
altered because of a change foreseen by the parties when making the
agreement 94 should be deleted.
Finally and fundamentally, rather than starting out with a
presumption that such agreements are void to the extent that they oust
the jurisdiction of the court to order financial relief,295 the MCA 1973
should start out with an assumption that they are valid. If the agreement
was executed between adults, regarding matters other than their
children, and there was full and fair disclosure of both parties' financial
circumstances, and it was presented in writing at least a statutorily
required number of days before the wedding, and both parties were
advised of their right to take independent counsel, then a heavy burden
of proof should be placed on the party attacking the agreement.
Unless and until Parliament at long last addresses these issues
statutorily, no one who might get divorced in England-whether a
prince or a commoner-can ever be assured that a deal is a deal.
294. See Matrimonial Causes Act § 35(2)(a).
295. See id. § 34(l)(a).
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